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Abstract 
Over the past years, crowdsourcing has increasingly been used for the discovery of 
vulnerabilities in software. While some organizations have extensively used 
crowdsourced vulnerability discovery, other organizations have been very hesitant in 
embracing this method. In this paper, we report the results of a qualitative study that 
reveals organizational concerns and fears in relation to crowdsourced vulnerability 
discovery. The study is based on 36 key informant interviews with various 
organizations. The study reveals a set of pre-adoption fears (i.e., lacking managerial 
expertise, low quality submissions, distrust in security professionals, cost escalation, 
lack of motivation of security professionals) as well as the post-adoption issues actually 
experienced. The study also identifies countermeasures that adopting organizations 
have used to mitigate fears and minimize issues. Implications for research and practice 
are discussed. 
Keywords:  Crowdsourcing; Vulnerability Discovery; Security; Bug Bounty; 
Vulnerability Reward Program; Empirical Research 
Introduction 
This paper is about the use of crowdsourced vulnerability discovery by organizations that use software 
systems. Vulnerability discovery in software systems is an essential security tasks for organizations. 
Vulnerability discovery refers to the systematic search for bugs, backdoors, security holes and other 
vulnerabilities in systems (Liu et al. 2012). The purpose is preventing later exploitation by hackers, loss 
of data and corresponding negative business impacts. Increased system complexity, the web 
environment and reliance on third-party parts (e.g., cloud services, open APIs, external programming 
libraries) makes it difficult for in-house IT experts to perform sufficiently extensive and timely 
vulnerability discovery 
Recently, a number of organizations have opted for crowdsourced approaches to vulnerability 
discovery. Crowdsourced vulnerability discovery benefits from the general advantages of 
crowdsourcing, such as diversity of participant skills, high scalability, fast speed and low cost (Brabham 
2008)(Malone et al. 2010)(Li et al. 2015). In crowdsourced vulnerability discovery programs (also 
called bug bounty programs or vulnerability reward programs), organizations submit vulnerability 
discovery tasks as an open call to a community of security professionals (we will refer to the white 
hackers participating in crowdsourced vulnerability discovery tasks as security professionals). Several 
crowdsourcing platforms for vulnerability discovery have emerged (e.g., Bugcrowd, HackerOne, 
Synack). Individual organizations that use crowdsourced vulnerability discovery programs include 
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Google, Facebook, Microsoft and the US Department of Defense (U.S. Department of Defense 2016a). 
Facebooks reports that crowdsourced vulnerability discovery provides higher diversity of discovered 
vulnerabilities (Greene 2016). The US Department of Defense found that the costs of crowdsourced 
vulnerability discovery substantially lower than alternative approaches (U.S. Department of Defense 
2016b) 
Despite the benefits of crowdsourced vulnerability discovery, a surprisingly large number of 
organizations do not use it. For example, less than 6% of Forbes Global 2000 companies use it as of 
2017 (HackerOne 2017), almost all of which run sizeable software systems. Organizations seem to be 
reluctant to embrace crowdsourced vulnerability discovery. Previous research investigated 
crowdsourced vulnerability discovery tasks in terms of benefit (M Finifter et al. 2013), effectiveness 
(Zhao et al. 2015), and crowd motivation(Laszka et al. 2016), but the underlying pre-adoption fears as 
well as the actual post-adoption issues have not been systematically studied.  
At present, we do not understand: What are pre-adoption fears of organizations regarding crowdsourced 
vulnerability discovery? What are actual post-adoption issues experienced? What countermeasures are 
used to mitigate fears and minimize issues? 
To answer the above research questions, we engaged in exploratory, empirical research. We conducted 
semi-structured interviews (with 36 key informants), and qualitative data analysis (Ezzy 2002; Seaman 
1999). In response to the research questions, we identify a set of pre-adoption fears that organizations 
have with respect to crowdsourced vulnerability discovery (i.e., lacking managerial expertise, low 
quality submissions, distrust in security professionals, cost escalation, lack of motivation of security 
professionals). We also identify a set of actual post-adoption issues adopting organizations face (i.e., 
low quality submissions, high cost of processing submissions, difficulties to maintain participants). 
Finally, we identified a set of countermeasures (i.e., learning, third party support, limiting participants, 
selective revealing, limiting scope and adjusting reward). These findings and the underlying analysis 
are reported in this paper. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in the next section we provide background information. 
In the subsequent section we present the research method. In the fourth section we summarize our 
findings. In the penultimate section we discuss our findings. We conclude the paper with a summary. 
Background and Related Work 
What is Crowdsourced Vulnerability Discovery? 
A “vulnerability” is a security flaw that arises from system design, implementation or maintenance. 
Examples include SQL injection vulnerability, and logic vulnerabilities (e.g., allowing a discount code 
in an online market to be used multiple times till the cost of the purchase is zero). By exploiting these 
vulnerabilities, malicious parties could gain unauthorized access to protected resources (Krsul 1998). 
Relying on a single vulnerability discovery methods like manual penetration testing, static analysis, 
dynamic analysis has been proven to be not enough (Austin and Williams 2011). Additionally, there 
has been an increase in number of security threats and incidents in the past years (ISACA 2017). This 
has motivated the emergence of crowdsourced vulnerability discovery as a contemporary method of 
vulnerability discovery. 
Crowdsourced vulnerability discovery works as follows. Organizations submit vulnerability discovery 
tasks to a community of security professionals. Security professionals upon discovering a specific 
vulnerability will make a submission of a vulnerability description report to the organization. The 
organization after verifying the legitimacy of the vulnerability will compensate the security professional 
with a reward. Crowdsourced vulnerability discovery has recently gained popularity as is evident from 
the increasing number of vulnerability discovery programs (Vijayan 2017). 
Related Work 
Researchers studied concerns, challenges, and issues of using crowdsourcing and how to mitigate them 
in various contexts. Lasecki et al. investigated different forms of threats from individuals and groups of 
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workers extracting information from crowd-powered systems or manipulating these systems’ outcomes 
(Lasecki et al. 2014). The authors also propose possible approaches to minimize and mitigate these 
threats. Daniel et al investigated quality control for crowdsourcing tasks and the methods to assess the 
quality attributes and the strategies that could be used to prevent and mitigate quality issues (Daniel et 
al. 2017). Wolfson et al. investigated the legal issues that may face organizations relying on 
crowdsourcing (Wolfson and Lease 2011). They identified several issues with employment laws, patent 
laws, data security, and copyrights. The authors provided recommendations to help address these legal 
issues. Stol and Fitzgerald investigated the challenges faced by organizations relying on crowdsourcing 
for software development (Stol and Fitzgerald 2014). They identified issues in regard to task 
decomposition, coordination and communication, planning and scheduling, quality assurance, and 
knowledge and intellectual property. Different strategies have been investigated by researcher to 
improve the quality of crowdsourced tasks. Filtering out the bad outcomes of the task is one strategy 
that has been investigated by researchers. Dow et al. filter outputs of the task based on expert’s reviews 
(Dow et al. 2012), Marcus et al. filter according to the ground truth (Marcus et al. 2012), and Rao et al 
filter according to majority voting (Rao et al. 2013). Incentivizing the crowd to provide high quality 
output is another strategy investigated to enhance the quality of submissions. Ho et al. in their work 
investigate the effect of financial incentives on the quality of crowd output (Ho et al. 2015). Providing 
feedback about the performance of the crowd worker has been discovered to help the workers provide 
better quality results (Dow et al. 2012). Kulkarni et al. in their work illustrate the effect of the task 
requester’s feedback on the quality of the output of the task (Kulkarni et al. 2012). Doroudi et al 
investigate the how to effectively teach the crowd by providing experts’ examples for the crowd to learn 
from (Doroudi et al. 2016). And finally, Gamifying the task has proven to produce better results 
specially in complex tasks(Krause and Kizilcec 2015). Law et al showed that designing tasks that induce 
curiosity improve worker’s retention in crowdsourcing (Law et al. 2016).  
Kannan and Telang studied regulated and unregulated vulnerability markets (Kannan and Telang 2005). 
They found that it is socially beneficial to offer rewards for benign vulnerability discoverers. Algarni et 
al. examined the motivations and methods of security professionals participating in vulnerability 
discovery. They have identified multiple vulnerability discovery markets where exchanges between the 
discoverers and the buyers take place. They found that the majority of security professionals 
participating in the task of vulnerability discovery are from outside the software organizations and that 
their key motivation is monetary reward (Algarni and Malaiya 2014). Finifter et al. examined the 
characteristics of two crowdsourced vulnerability discovery programs (Matthew Finifter et al. 2013). 
They concluded that such programs appear economically efficient compared to the cost of hiring full-
time security professionals. Zhao et al. conducted quantitative analyses for different vulnerability 
aspects of the Web ecosystem (Zhao et al. 2015). They found that monetary incentives have a 
significantly positive correlation with the number of vulnerabilities reported. They also investigated 
productivity and accuracy of the individuals (i.e. the number of valid submission against invalid 
submissions). Laszka et al. proposed a strategy that would incentivize Security professionals 
participating in task to self-assess their submissions and hence minimize invalid submissions (Laszka 
et al. 2016). 
Analyzing and understanding the perception of organizations with respect to the fears surrounding 
crowdsourced-based vulnerability discovery tasks, the issues faced by the adopters of this approach and 
the strategies and techniques used by them to minimize or mitigate these fears and issues is paramount 
to understand the field. To the best of our knowledge, while previously identified as much “needed 
future work” by other researchers (Zhao et al. 2015), no existing work provides a rigorous analysis of 
fears, issues and countermeasures regarding vulnerability discovery programs as presented in this paper. 
Research Method 
Our research methodology consists of iterative phases of data collection and data analysis. We 
interviewed 36 key informants (personnel who hold authority in the field of security; oversee the 
security posture of organizations; and influence (directly or indirectly) the security strategy within 
organizations). We invited participants affiliated with organizations mentioned in a community-curated 
list of crowdsourced vulnerability discovery and disclosure programs, namely (Firebounty 2015). We 
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sent direct e-mail invitations to 126 organizations with publicly available contact information. We 
advertised our study to information security groups on LinkedIn. We also used snowballing to get 
recommendations from security professionals about colleagues who would be interested to participate 
in our study (Research-office 2015). It was apparent that snowballing is the most effective approach 
since a more direct approach may often be considered as phishing –especially as phishing attacks are 
well known by security professionals who are much more cautious before accepting invitations from 
unknown parties. Another approach that proved effective is to directly approach the key informants 
during cyber security events (e.g., OWASP chapter meetings). This gave us the opportunity to explain 
the motivation of our research, and increased interest in the study. 
The interviews were conducted by one of the authors according to an interview guide (Interview 2016). 
Summaries of the interviews were discussed to draw insights and identify the key emerging themes. 
The interviews lasted between 30 and 60 minutes and were conducted face-to-face, via Skype, tele-
presence systems or phone calls. Audio was recorded when the interviewee consented, and notes were 
taken. The interviews were semi-structured based on the literature review and online content 
investigation, and interviewers could ask additional follow-up questions. 
We followed the recommendations of Adler and Adler and aimed for a sample size between 12 and 60 
participants (Baker and Edwards 2012). We used the criterion of theoretical saturation (i.e., no new 
insights were emerging from new instances) to determine the appropriate end point of our empirical 
data collection (Corbin and Strauss 1998; Ezzy 2002). When it was feasible we reinitiated contact with 
some of the interviewees to further clarify. To cater for diverse perspectives, we invited participants 
from different disciplines (e.g., finance, entertainment, and communications). The positions of the 
interview participants were diversified as well (e.g., CTOs, CISOs, IT managers, security analysts, 
security testing team leaders). The sample included small (25-100 employees), medium (100-500 
employees), and large (over 500 employees) organizations. Participants are referred to by an 
anonymous identifier denoted as (P#). Among the interviewees, 10 participants (P3, P11, P13, P14, P17, 
P24, P25, P29, P33 and P34) have experience in crowdsourced vulnerability discovery programs. 
For the data analysis, following each interview, we transcribed all interview data; we organized the 
transcripts and associated notes into easily retrievable sections. We also obtained increased familiarity 
with the data through reading and re-reading and writing down notes and summaries. We coded the data 
using the techniques of thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke 2006; Ezzy 2002): we first analyzed the 
data through open coding, developing a codebook that we refined over time. We aggregated relevant 
open codes into higher-level abstract codes (concepts) and analyzed the relationship between these 
concepts (taking into consideration existing theory and terminology, so as to connect our analysis to the 
ongoing academic discourse). 
Findings 
In this section, we summarize the fears, issues and countermeasures that emerged from our study. We 
discuss the findings from the interviews; and provide quotes to help explain how we derived our 
conclusions. We also explored the reasoning behind the answers. A summary of the findings from this 
study is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Fears 
We identified five themes in relation to fears that organizations have prior to using crowdsourcing for 
vulnerability discovery (Lacking managerial expertise, low quality submissions, distrust in security 
professionals, cost escalation, and lack of motivation of security professionals) 
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Figure 1 Summary of the Findings (arrows represent the relationship between the 
countermeasure and the fear or issue) 
Lacking Managerial Expertise  
Crowdsourcing vulnerability discovery is a relatively new paradigm. Being able to successfully plan, 
launch and manage the task require some knowledge and expertise. The effect on the success of the task 
due to lacking expertise is one of the fears of organizations. A product security evaluation lead in one 
of the global telecommunication equipment companies said “We have experts in all security disciplines 
but when it comes to running a crowdsourced vulnerability discovery program the skill-set is different. 
The field is relatively new, and it is not easy to recruit people with required experience” [P27]. It was 
also observed during the interviews that the key informants kept asking about the opinion of the authors 
and their recommendations. 
Low-Quality Submissions 
As security professionals have different backgrounds, skills and expertise, the outcomes may differ in 
quality. A low-quality submission may render worthless for the organization, since they will not be able 
to extract the required information to verify the legitimacy of the vulnerability and hence remediate it. 
A senior security lead in one of the business management companies shared his fears in regard to the 
quality of the report itself and whether it can be understood easily and proved useful “These hackers 
are from all around the world and so submitting reports that are not clear, not complete or plain 
ambiguous, would force our security staff to spend hours looking at it and in the end, it may or may not 
be useful” [P10].  
Vulnerabilities differ in their impact if exploited, and they differ in the complexity of the exploitation. 
Several systems have thus been used to assign priorities to vulnerabilities (e.g., Common Vulnerability 
Scoring System (FIRST.Org 2015)). Organizations expressed the fear that the submitted vulnerabilities 
would be of low severity or acceptable risk. A security and systems engineer in a financial institute 
mentioned, “We have seen teenagers, hobbyists, and even housewives participating in programs, I doubt 
that the next Remote Code Execution vulnerability will come through them” [P25]. 
It was shown that organizations value actionable outcomes that would help them increase the level of 
security and that efficiency is an important aspect to consider. A penetration testing team leader in one 
of the security consultation companies mentioned “it is unreasonable to pay thousands of dollars for a 
pile of rubbish submissions only in hope to find some jewels inside” [P19]. 
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Distrust in Security Professionals 
Delegating a security task of vulnerability discovery requires a great deal of trust. Trust would be 
distributed between the security professionals and the platform that the organizations use to launch the 
task. Security professionals could be anywhere in the world and the organization would have a relatively 
limited information about them. A Chief Technology Officer of a security controls software company 
mentioned “To trust security professionals that we have only minimum information about such a critical 
task is somewhat difficult to absorb” [P20]. This could be due to the nature of security personnel as they 
are trained not to offer their trust easily. 
Organizations also fear that the security professionals will participate in the task only to find 
vulnerabilities they can sell in the black market. This might be due to the perception that the 
vulnerability black market is more rewarding than the legal market (e.g., a grey market company in 
2015 offered 1 million dollars for a vulnerability and working exploit for iOS). A senior security analyst 
in a SaaS provider mentioned “The grey market now is getting traction and selling there would be less 
risky and more profitable so how can we compete” [P26]. 
It was also reported that lacking the ability to hold legal accountability is one of the fears, since security 
professionals could be anywhere in the world where it is not possible to legally prosecute them if they 
act maliciously. An information security expert in a telecommunication company mentioned, “If 
security professionals act mischievously, who do we hold responsible for that? How can we pursue 
them legally? Or do we go after the platform that crowdsourced the task on our behalf?” [P7]. 
Costs Escalation 
Crowdsourcing vulnerability discovery has a unique budgeting requirement. For crowdsourcing 
microtasks the organization can have a rough estimate about the cost (e.g., the task of transcribing 100 
pages would mean multiplying 100 with the cost of one page and taking in consideration some 
management overhead and contingencies). Similarly, for competition-based tasks (e.g., ideas, software 
development, design) the organization announces a prize for the winner submitting the best solution 
and limits the costs of the prize. While for crowdsourcing vulnerability discovery, although it is also a 
competition-based task, the tasks can have multiple winners. As along as the security professional 
submits a valid vulnerability, the company has to abide by the rules for payments mentioned in the task 
description. Hence the number of vulnerabilities discovered cannot be determined and is related to the 
security of the product being tested and the number of security professionals participating in the task. 
A quality assurance team lead in a backup solutions company mentioned, “budgeting for a 
crowdsourced program is hard, we cannot predict how many vulnerabilities will be discovered and paid 
for” [P4].  A security lead in a SaaS provider described crowdsourcing vulnerability discovery as a 
potential “financial black hole” [P30]. 
Lack of Motivation of Security Professionals 
Attracting security professionals to participate in the task is important especially in the presence of other 
crowdsourced vulnerability discovery tasks to compete with. A senior security engineer in a system 
integration service provider company mentioned “How can we know if we are paying the right amount 
for the discovered vulnerabilities? We do not want to be pay less and drive security professionals away 
or pay more than what we should” [P16]. Similarly, maintaining engagement and ensuring a stable flow 
of submissions will help organizations to have better coverage in terms of vulnerabilities discovered. A 
Chief Security Officer in a software provider company mentioned “When the program is running for a 
while and security professionals stop submitting vulnerabilities to us, does that mean our product is 
secure and there is nothing to find? Or is it just that security professionals picked the low hanging fruits 
and they are not interested anymore?” [P31]. 
Issues  
Three issues were reported by organizations who have adopted crowdsourcing vulnerability discovery:  
Low Quality Submissions 
It has been reported that some organization had issues of low signal to noise ratio. Noise could be in 
the form of invalid reports, duplicates, spam, and out of scope. Organizations consider this issue to be 
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a major one, as it would cause them to waste both time and resources to filter out the low-quality 
submissions. An internal security assessor in a charity organization mentioned, “we get bombarded by 
a huge number of reports that our team need to go through one by one and most of the time it is more 
noise than legitimate vulnerabilities” [P13]. The quality of the report is also important to the 
organization since the report is useless if organizations cannot reproduce and validate the vulnerability 
due to the report being incomplete or not clear. A security lead in a mobile gaming company mentioned, 
“It is time and effort consuming when we go back and forth asking for missing details, explanation, and 
proof of concept. This problem is amplified with reports that were prepared using services such as 
Google translate to translate from the original language of the security professional” [P14].  
High Cost of Processing Submissions 
When the organization receives a vulnerability report, they need to verify the legitimacy of the 
vulnerability discovered, making sure it was not reported before; determining the impact and severity 
of vulnerability; paying out the bounty to the security professional; and following-up with the 
development team to make sure that the vulnerability is remediated properly. This process when applied 
to a huge number of submissions would create burdens on the internal staff responsible for the process. 
A security lead in a mobile gaming company mentioned “When we started our program we had some 
issues assigning tasks related to our crowdsourcing program to our internal team, we were putting too 
much pressure on our internal staff and that was affecting their daily tasks along with delays in 
processing the submitted vulnerabilities. We ended up hiring additional internal staff to take care of the 
vulnerability triage” [P14].  
Difficulties to Maintain Participants 
Security professionals who frequently submit vulnerability reports, in essence, spend more time on the 
same task and build some sort of loyalty to the task. If the organization does not manage to maintain 
engagement with security professionals, then the submissions for the task will dropped (Leyden 2016). 
A senior security consultant in a security consultation company mentioned “It is not easy to ensure 
engagement of security professionals and it is quite expected for submissions to drop dramatically after 
few weeks of launching the program when the low hanging fruits have already been picked up” [P3]. 
Competing with other organizations running crowdsourced vulnerability discovery tasks is also a 
challenge. A director of security architecture in a software provider company mentioned “After the low 
hanging fruits in our program is depleted, it is a matter of which organization keeps their program more 
profitable and interesting to keep the security professionals engaged” [P24]. 
Countermeasures 
Five countermeasures were reported: Learning over time; relying on third party support; inviting only 
experts and vetted security professionals; selective reveal of information; and adjust rewards. It is to be 
noted that sometimes a countermeasure could be applied for more than one fear or issue (e.g., invite 
only experts and vetted security professionals can help with both issues of low quality submissions, as 
well as lack of trust in security professionals) 
Learning  
Organizations gain experience by running the crowdsourced vulnerability discovery task over a period 
of time. Organizations learn from the experiences they come across during the crowdsourced task. A 
security lead in a multimedia company mentioned, “We carefully assess every step we take while 
running our bug bounty program and we hold meetings to reflect and decide our next step” [P11]. 
Additionally, organizations learn from observing other organizations that is running a crowdsourced 
vulnerability discovery task. A security and system engineer in a financial institute mentioned “The 
stories and bug bounty program reviews done by other companies helped us, by knowing that other 
people walked the same path and how they handled some of the problems we are facing” [P25]. 
Third-Party Support 
Organizations who did not have the knowledge and the expertise to launch and manage a crowdsourced 
vulnerability discovery task relied on professional services provided by third parties (e.g., Platforms for 
crowdsourcing vulnerability discovery). A security lead in a social media company mentioned, “We 
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depended a lot on the platform to give us guidance how to design and run our program and we 
outsourced tasks of the triage process to the platform” [P17].  
We identified that relying on the third-party support helped organizations to offload the burden of 
controlling the quality of submissions and managing the cost of processing the submissions. An internal 
security assessor in one of the charity organizations mentioned “We got help from the platform in 
managing our program and triaging the large number of submissions since we did not want to hire more 
people for a permanent position which would be costly” [P13]. 
Limiting Participants 
Inviting only selected security professionals according to their expertise, past performance, or other 
criterion, is a strategy used by organizations to increase the quality of the outcome of the crowdsourced 
task of vulnerability discovery. It is a well-known strategy in the field of crowdsourcing vulnerability 
discovery and is often referred to as private programs (e.g., Onelogin private program (OneLogin 2017))  
or invite only programs (e.g., Apple invite only bug bounty program (Conger 2016)). A senior product 
security engineer in a software provider company mentioned “We prefer to keep our program invite 
only since working with amateurs would be time consuming and will cause us to get less the output for 
double the effort” [P34]. 
We have also observed that selecting security professionals with verified expertise and identities is 
relied on by organizations to minimize the fear of untrustworthy security professionals participating in 
crowdsourced vulnerability discovery tasks. A product manager in a Bitcoin exchange services 
company mentioned “We prefer to work with a few selective vetted security professionals with good 
track record, since it is risky to work with amateurs in terms of tools they use that could be damaging 
and the maturity to know when to stop” [P29].  
Selective Revealing 
Organizations may share information with security professionals to help them discover vulnerabilities 
more effectively (e.g., source-code, test credentials, entry points, access to unreleased products). In 
order to minimize the concerns with respect to the trustworthiness of security professionals participating 
in crowdsourced tasks of vulnerability discovery, organization tend to control the reveal of some 
information. The director of security architecture in a software provider company mentioned “the 
source-code of our product is a very important asset to our company, so we do not share our source-
code with security professionals even if it means we may minimize the efficiency of our bug bounty 
program” [P24]. Some organizations allow access to a staging environment with synthetic data to 
minimize the risk of accidental access to customer data. A security and systems engineer in a financial 
institute mentioned “Our program run in a staging environment to eliminate any chance that the security 
professional would get access to our customer data even if by accident during testing” [P25].  
Limiting Scope 
Each crowdsourcing vulnerability discovery task has a scope that helps security professionals 
understand clearly what the targets are (e.g., domains, services, applications), and what are the 
acceptable submissions (e.g., types of vulnerabilities the organization is interested in). Organizations 
also need to manage the expectations of security professionals in regard to the reward they will receive 
in compensation for investing their time to discover the vulnerabilities (e.g., range of monetary rewards, 
recognition). In order to manage the unpredictability of cost when a crowdsourced vulnerability 
discovery task is launched, organizations tend to start with small scope and reward scheme. A platform 
security lead in a multimedia company mentioned “We started small with only the main domains we 
have and providing only swag to the security professionals in return for their responsible disclosure of 
vulnerability, this way we can start with a smaller budget that the board would more likely approve and 
minimize the possibility of a spike in the payments” [P11]. 
We observed that limiting the scope and rewards was also used to minimize the flood of submissions 
and help the organization cope with the lack of expertise for managing a crowdsourced vulnerability 
discovery task. A security lead in a social media company mentioned “We took baby steps throughout 
our program and the scope was in the beginning only our mobile app, so we knew which team needs to 
be on alert and we had the flexibility to better absorb how the program is working” [P17]. 
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Adjusting Rewards 
If the crowdsourced task for vulnerability discovery was running for a long time and all the easy to find 
vulnerabilities were discovered, organizations need to motivate security professionals to keep engaged 
in the task. One way to motivate security professionals is through adjusting the rewards provided to 
them. A security lead in a social media company mentioned “In the beginning, we get a flood of simple, 
easy to find, spams, and duplicates, but after a while the submissions drop drastically, so we try to keep 
things interesting for security professionals by increasing the bounties and providing bonuses for high 
impact vulnerabilities and clever exploitation” [P17]. 
Discussion 
We observed that organizations have some fears with respect to crowdsourced vulnerability discovery 
including,: lacking managerial expertise, low quality submissions, distrust in security professionals, 
cost escalation, lack of motivation of security professionals. We also observed that organizations that 
have adopted crowdsourced vulnerability discovery have reported issues they have faced including: low 
quality submissions, high cost of processing submissions and difficulties to maintain participants. 
Additionally, these organizations reported countermeasures they have relied on to minimize or mitigate 
these fears and issues: learning, third party support, limiting participants, selective revealing, limiting 
scope and adjusting reward. 
It was evident from our findings that some fears are manifested into actual issues faced by the 
organizations (e.g., lack of motivation of security professionals, low quality submissions, cost 
escalation) while others did not (e.g., lacking managerial expertise and Lacking trust in security 
professionals). This could be the effect of using the countermeasures (such as, relying on third party 
support, selective reveal of information to security professionals and inviting only expert and vetted 
security professionals) as preventive measures to mitigate these fears before they occur. 
Previous research investigated crowdsourcing vulnerability discovery: quantitatively by analyzing data 
sets of vulnerability submissions (Matthew Finifter et al. 2013; Maillart et al. 2017; Munaiah and 
Meneely 2016; Zhao et al. 2014, 2015), or qualitatively relying on input from security professionals 
participating in vulnerability discovery tasks (Al-Banna et al. 2016; Algarni and Malaiya 2013, 2014; 
Hafiz and Fang 2016). Some research proposed solutions to existing problems like incentivizing 
security professionals to submit valid vulnerabilities (Laszka et al. 2016), or helping organizations 
against the high rate of submissions through crowdsourcing vulnerability verification (Su and Pan 
2016). To the best of our knowledge our work is the first to investigate (through a qualitative analysis 
of interview data) how organizations perceive crowdsourced vulnerability discovery. We think it is 
important in setting the foundation of a wholesome understanding of crowdsourced driven tasks on 
vulnerability discovery. We believe that a better understanding of the fears, issues surrounding the 
crowdsourced task of vulnerability discovery and the countermeasures currently relied on by 
organizations to mitigate or minimize these issues and fears, can help researchers investigate how to 
adopt countermeasures from other domains of crowdsourcing. 
Improving the quality of the output of the crowdsourced task has been the focus of many researchers. 
Filtering out the bad outcomes of the task is one strategy that has been investigated by researchers. Dow 
et al. filter outputs of task based on expert’s reviews (Dow et al. 2012), Marcus et al. filter according to 
the ground truth (Marcus et al. 2012), and Rao et al filter according to majority voting (Rao et al. 2013). 
Given the high noise in the output of the crowdsourced task of vulnerability discovery (BugCrowd 
2017), filtering the noise (invalid, duplicates, out of scope…etc.) would be most desirable. 
Nevertheless, due to the complexity of the task and the sensitivity of the submission one plausible 
approach is to rely on expert reviews for filtering, such as the latest service offered by Hackerone called 
Human Augmented Signal (Russchen 2018), where the organization delegate the task of filtering noise 
to the staff of the platform. Also relying on machine learning (e.g., content analysis and entity 
extraction) could also be helpful to filter out duplicates and out of scope submission. Maleej and Nabil 
in their work relied on machine learning to classify app reviews to determine whether it is a bug report, 
a feature request or just a praise (Maalej and Nabil 2015). Platforms like Hackerone has a tool they call 
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trigger action where it relies on text analysis to trigger an alert or an action in case it detects and 
expression (Hackerone 2018). 
Incentivizing the crowd to provide high quality output is a method investigated to enhance the quality 
of submissions. Ho et al. in their work investigate the effect of financial incentives on the quality of 
crowd output (Ho et al. 2015). Laszka et al. proposed a strategy that would incentivize security 
professionals participating in the crowdsourced vulnerability discovery task to self-assess their 
submissions and hence minimize invalid submissions (Laszka et al. 2016). 
Another way to improve the quality of the output of the task is to train the crowd and help them produce 
better output. Providing feedback about the performance of the crowd worker has been discovered to 
help the workers provide better quality results (Dow et al. 2012). Kulkarni et al. in their work illustrate 
the effect of the task requester’s feedback on the quality of the output of the task (Kulkarni et al. 2012). 
Doroudi et al investigate the how to effectively teach the crowd by providing experts’ examples for the 
crowd to learn from (Doroudi et al. 2016). Platforms like Hackerone offer security professionals access 
to some submitted vulnerability reports and by providing access to some online courses and materials. 
The crowdsourced task description (aka program brief) contains the information the organization share 
with the security professionals so that they can effectively perform the task. Enhancing the clarity of 
the task description can help the Security professionals better understand what they need to do and what 
they would expect within the program (Kuehn and Mueller 2014). Additionally, making sure that the 
task description contains all the information needed by the security professional would also help in 
minimizing error (e.g., by mentioning what is out of the scope of the program the possibility that 
Security professionals would submit out of scope reports is minimized)(Bugcrowd 2016). 
In regard to the engagement with the crowd, Finifter et al in their work highlights that offering extra 
reward top-ups and bonuses increase engagement with Security professionals. Similarly, Zhao et al. 
describe bonuses as a good way to incentivize new participants (Zhao et al. 2015). Additionally, 
researchers found that offering hiring opportunities for Security professionals who perform well in the 
crowdsourced vulnerability discovery task incentivize them and keep them engaged (Chatfield and 
Reddick 2017; Matthew Finifter et al. 2013; Zhao et al. 2014). Gamifying the task has proven to produce 
better results specially in complex tasks(Krause and Kizilcec 2015). Law et al showed that designing 
tasks that induce curiosity improve worker’s retention in crowdsourcing (Law et al. 2016). Platforms 
like Bugcrowd, Hackerone and organizations like Google and Facebook acknowledge the importance 
of gamification and rely on ranking Security professionals and creating a reputation system to create 
competition between the participants. 
We have observed that the lack of managerial expertise has been raised as one of the pre-adoption fears 
and that organizations who have adopted crowdsourced vulnerability discovery has tackled this fear 
actively with learning over time, rely on support from third party and limited scope and budget 
initiation. It would be interesting from a practical perspective to establish the skill set required for 
managing a crowdsourced vulnerability discovery task. Platforms for crowdsourcing vulnerability 
discovery like Hackerone have suggested some requirements for what they called a bug bounty leader 
(Bacchus 2016) (the person responsible for managing the crowdsourced task of vulnerability 
discovery). We believe that in addition for the technical security skills the candidate need to be familiar 
with crowdsourcing and the quality control assessment methods (e.g., rating, peer review and content 
analysis) and assurance strategies (e.g., data cleansing, task recommendation and task decomposition) 
(Daniel et al. 2017). There are also some industrial standards that the candidate need to be familiar with 
like ISO29147 Vulnerability Disclosure, ISO30111-Vulnerability handling process and control 
A.12.6.1 of ISO27001-Technical vulnerability management. 
Our work will help organizations and crowdsourcing platforms for vulnerability discovery be aware of 
fears and issues perceived in regard to crowdsourcing vulnerability discovery and help design the task 
to minimize and mitigate these fears and issues. There is no ‘one task fits all’ solution for crowdsourcing 
vulnerability discovery and hence organizations need take into consideration the relevant fears and 
issues associated and the best countermeasures to minimize or mitigate them. By looking at current 
countermeasure strategies and how they are being used, organizations can adapt their own set of 
countermeasures, and platforms can work on enhancing these countermeasures. 
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There are some limitations to this study. The data was collected in 2015-2016 from a broad range for 
organizations. While this allowed us to draw some interesting insights from various perspectives, we 
did not study any one case over a long period of time. The in-depth analysis of particularly interesting 
cases over longer periods may reveal additional insights, as may the application of additional 
methodological lenses. We neither aim nor claim to provide a universal, timeless truth with the 
knowledge claims inductively developed here. Although we obtained feedback from a broad range of 
organizations, it is possible that there are some fields that we could not reach key informants working 
in these respective fields (e.g., government). Similarly, we tried to reach out to organizations that had a 
failed implementation of a crowdsourced vulnerability discovery task, but we were unsuccessful. This 
would help to gain even further insight. Nonetheless, we have aimed to mitigate this shortcoming by 
targeting various industries in order to obtain a broader view of possible perspectives. One of the authors 
of this paper also attended multiple security conferences (e.g., BSides, Ruxcon), to directly discuss with 
attendees. Although some feedback was acquired about the study from key informants, it was mostly 
an off-the-record approach. As the interviews were semi structured, another problem concerning the 
validity is that the study may suffer from confirmatory bias. In order to mitigate this concern, we started 
each interview with open questions about their perception in regard to crowdsourcing vulnerability 
discovery and wrote notes to review in regard to what they mentioned, and also closed the interview by 
asking if there are additional information they wanted to share with us. We also asked for clarification 
about each concern the interviewee may have in order to minimize any possible bias that may influence 
the interviewees to answer in agreement just to please the researchers. 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we reported the results from a qualitative study that sought to gain insight about 
organizational concerns, issues and countermeasures in relation to crowdsourced vulnerability 
discovery tasks. The study was based on 36 key informant interviews from various organizations. The 
study revealed a set of pre-adoption fears of using crowdsourced vulnerability discovery (lacking 
managerial expertise, low quality submissions, distrust in security professionals, cost escalation, lack 
of motivation of security professionals) as well as the actual issues faced by organizations that have 
adopted crowdsourced vulnerability discovery low quality submissions, high cost of processing 
submissions, difficulties to maintain participants). The study also identified countermeasures that 
organizations have used to mitigate or minimize these fears and issues (learning, third party support, 
limiting participants, selective revealing, limiting scope and adjusting reward). The implications for 
research and practice of these findings were discussed. 
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